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Abstract. Despite pressure for reform and the concomitant 
benefits of more inclusive and participatory electoral sys-
tems, major electoral reform in Canada rarely takes place 
through legislative or public deliberative processes. As a 
result, citizens demanding electoral reform have turned to 
other venues to pursue their claims for democratic change. 
This article considers such venue shifting efforts through the 
use of the courts to pursue electoral reform in Canada. Using 
precedent tracing and content analysis approaches, it con-
siders all the final judicial decisions citing the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s decision on democratic rights in Figueroa 
v. Canada. It finds that courts were willing to intervene in 
some cases involving technical aspects of the exercise of 
democratic rights, but tend not to entertain more major 
systemic-based reforms. As such, the article concludes that 
such pursuits for democratic reform through judicialization 
are likely to fail. 
 







Résumé. Malgré les pressions pour conduire des réformes 
et les avantages concomitants qui se trouvent dans des sys-
tèmes électoraux plus inclusifs et participatifs, les réformes 
électorales au Canada ont rarement lieu par le biais de pro-
cessus législatifs ou délibératifs. Ainsi, les citoyens appelant 
à des réformes électorales se sont tournés vers d’autres 
cadres pour mener à bien leurs demandes de changement 
démocratique. Cet article considère que ces efforts se maté-
rialisent dans l’usage des tribunaux pour continuer les ré-
formes électorales au Canada. En utilisant la jurisprudence 
et l’approche de l’analyse du contenu, cet article analyse 
toutes les décisions judiciaires finales qui citent la décision 
de la Cour Suprême du Canada sur les droits démocratiques, 
Figueroa v. Canada. Cet article suggère que les tribunaux se 
sont montrés désireux d’intervenir dans quelques cas qui 
impliquent des aspects techniques relatifs à l’exercice de 
droits démocratiques, mais ont été plus réservées s’agissant 
de réformes plus vastes. Ainsi, il conclut que les efforts pour 
poursuivre les réformes démocratiques par le biais de la 
judiciarisation sont probablement voués à l’échec. 
 






While Canadians have traditionally demonstrated little 
concern over the broader issues associated with electoral 
reform (Massicotte 2001), the first half of the 2000s decade 
marked a significant departure from the status quo. Con-
cerns with the lack of representative nature of the Canadian 
governance system drove electoral reform and other demo-
cratic deficit issues higher on both public and government 
agendas and caused political actors to pursue various types 
of democratic reform (Studlar 2003, Aucoin and Turnbull 
2003). At the federal level, changes were made by successive 
Liberal and Conservative governments to an election financ-
ing regime for parties that had remained relatively un-
touched for almost thirty years. The combined effect was to 
limit the amount of contributions that could be provided by 
individual Canadians, removed corporate and union funding 
as a source for contributions and provided a publicly funded 
subsidy on a per vote basis, thereby significantly altering the 
methods of financing parties, elections and leadership cam-
paigns (Tanguay 2009). The pursuit of the holy grail of 
electoral reform, changing the voting method, also received 
considerable attention and consideration. While ultimately 
unsuccessful, there was reason for proponents of electoral 
system change to be hopeful. In early 2004, the Law Com-
mission of Canada provided a report to the federal govern-
ment recommending change from the single member plural-
ity system to one based on proportional representation. The 
two major opposition parties also included significant elec-
toral reform provisions in their election platforms, including 
consideration of changes to the voting method. Furthermore, 
at least half of the provincial governments explored the 
potential of changing their method of selecting representa-
tives, albeit to varying degrees (Stephenson and Tanguay 
2009). In British Columbia and Ontario, governments went 
so far as to convene citizens’ assemblies to debate the issues 
associated with possible reform and hold referenda to poll 
their respective populations on the subject. However, despite 
the potential for and the significant efforts expended in 
pursuit of electoral system change, no actor or organization 
was successful in bringing about this institutional reform at 
any level of government in Canada.  
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There is another, less well-known element to the pursuit 
of electoral reform in Canada during this time, namely its 
consideration in multiple sites of decision-making authority. 
One such consideration was the strategic choice to use litiga-
tion as means of pursuing democratic reform agendas. While 
the democratic rights provisions set out in section 3 of the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms did not receive much judi-
cial consideration during the first two decades of the Charter 
era (MacIvor 2004), there has been an increasing number of 
cases involving the litigation of section 3 over the course of 
the last decade (Knight 1999). Chief amongst these cases was 
the Supreme Court of Canada's 2003 decision in Figueroa v. 
Canada (Attorney General) where the court clarified the mean-
ing and purposes of the democratic rights provisions of the 
Charter to provide Canadian citizens with the opportunity 
for both “effective representation” arising from and “mean-
ingful participation” in the electoral system.  
This article examines the impact of the venue shifting of 
the democratic reform debate into the courts in Canada and 
evaluates whether this site of decision-making authority 
provides a means for achieving electoral reform. Underlying 
this focus is the growing trend within Canada and other 
democratic states for a diverse range of actors, both external 
to and within government, to seek judicial consideration of 
democratic processes and other forms of mega-politics 
(Hirschl 2008). In this regard, the judicialization of political 
disputes is viewed, in part, as a strategy employed by politi-
cal actors to shift the venue of contestation of an issue in an 
effort to either enhance or rebut efforts at securing institu-
tional change (Baumgartner and Jones 1991). Our findings 
demonstrate the difficulty of this approach to institutional 
change through the use of litigation due to the particular 
biases and characteristics of courts as sites of decision-
making authority. In pursuit of this argument, we employ an 
institutionalist examination of the courts in the context of 
various electoral reform challenges in Canada as a means of 
illuminating the receptiveness of this site of institutional 
decision-making authority to particular types or forms of 
discourse. In particular, we find that the consistent utiliza-
tion and application of procedural and technical definitions 
of democracy, rather than the application of broader and 
more normative interpretations of the meaning of “effective 
representation” and “meaningful participation, in considera-
tion of claims for electoral reform and greater democratic 
legitimacy, constitutes a key attribute of the courts as an 
institution. As a result of this bias, we find that courts may 
address individual and procedural based constraints in the 
electoral system, but tend not to intervene where greater 
systemic institutional change was sought. As such, the article 
concludes that the courts, as a venue, are not particularly 
receptive to normative based concerns associated with elec-
toral system change. As a result, our article therefore serves 
to not only explain electoral reform successes and failures 
through the courts in Canada, but also moves beyond the 
electoral reform debate and contributes to the broader neo-
institutionalist literature by providing greater insight into 
the characteristics and biases of courts as institutions. 
The article is organized in the following manner. The first 
section undertakes a brief examination of the literature on 
electoral reform, judicialization and venue shifting. The 
second section briefly reviews the Supreme Court of Cana-
da’s decisions under section 3 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms culminating in its 2003 Figueroa decision where 
the court clarified the scope of the democratic rights under 
section 3 to include effective representation and meaningful 
participation. The third section explores the judicialization 
of electoral reform in Canada post-Figueroa through an 
examination of all of the final judicial decisions in Canada 
following that decision, thereby establishing the circum-
stances under which courts were willing to intervene in the 
electoral process. The fourth section places the electoral 
reform debate into a broader consideration of the judicializa-
tion of democratic practices and draws conclusions concern-
ing the state of democracy in Canada. 
 
Electoral Reform, Judicialization and Venue 
Shifting 
 
The general emphasis of the electoral reform debate litera-
ture has been on the impact of and the particular advantages 
and disadvantages of different types of electoral systems, 
with much more limited consideration on the processes 
associated with the successes or failures in implementing 
electoral system change (Katz 2005, 2011). More recently, 
there has been a growing interest on the causes of both situa-
tions of reform as well as stability. This has led to the identi-
fication and consideration of at least seven different obsta-
cles to electoral reform of varying degrees of intensity (Rahat 
and Hazan 2011).1 However, in Canada, one such perceived 
barrier, the institutional pathway provided through the 
courts by way of a Charter claim, may provide as much an 
opportunity for reform as a constraint (MacIvor 2004, 
Knight 1999). Historically, efforts at enacting electoral re-
form in Canada were concentrated not on changes to the 
method of voting, but rather on disproportionalities between 
electoral districts (Massicotte 2005). This focus has shifted 
to the method of voting within the electoral system and has 
culminated in criticisms of Canada’s first-past-the-post 
electoral system as being under-representative, leading to 
false majority governments with a lack of majority support in 
the population, a disengagement of the electorate from poli-
tics and declining voter turnout, and a significant contrib-
uting factor to regionalism in the country (Cairns 1968, 
Milner 2000, Pilon 2007). Conversely, it has also been the 
suggested that change in the method of voting may do more 
harm than good and should be approached cautiously 
(Courtney 1980, Carty 2004). The more recent investiga-
tions by various provincial governments in Canada of elec-
toral system change, whether by virtue of government com-
mittee, independent commissions, citizen assemblies or 
referendum, has led to a renewed interest in the electoral 
reform debate. It has also resulted in wider investigations 
into the processes associated with attempts at enacting 
electoral system reform in Canada (Mendelson, Parkin and 
Van Kralingen 2001). In particular, the unique processes (at 
least by Canadian standards) employed by the provinces of 
Ontario and British Columbia to change to their electoral 
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systems has resulted in explorations of those processes and 
the causes of their failures (LeDuc, Bastedo and Baquero 
2008, Stephenson and Tanguay 2009). The previous argu-
ments for electoral system reform have been rooted in asser-
tions that the implementation of a different electoral system 
may result in increased youth engagement, gender balance, 
stronger local representation, a Parliament that would better 
reflect the diversity of the population, and fairer election 
results. While these are substantial arguments in favour of 
electoral system reform, the venues in which these argu-
ments were contemplated and advanced failed to generate 
the desired outcomes. More recently, proponents of electoral 
system reform have advocated for the use of Charter-based 
litigation as a plausible means of achieving their electoral 
reform goals (MacIvor 2004, Pilon 2007). This approach is 
predicated on a fundamentally different argument than has 
been advanced in other institutions, mainly that the first-
past-the-post system does not treat all votes equally and is 
therefore a violation of the democratic rights provisions of 
the Charter (Knight 1999).  
The pursuit of this strategic litigation approach to elec-
toral system change is neither novel nor particularly surpris-
ing. In fact, there is an increasing tendency in Canada and 
other Western democratic states to transform political con-
flicts into legal disputes. (Shapiro and Stone Sweet 2002; 
Bazowski 2004; Hirschl 2008). As the use of the courts and 
legal discourses and concepts to contest political issues has 
increased, so has the importance in the questions under 
contestation, including the consideration of fundamental 
and core political questions (Hirschl 2006). With these 
developments has come a growing understanding that courts 
are important actors in the political and policy-making pro-
cesses. Rather than viewed as simple adjudicative bodies 
that resolve disputes on a case-by-case basis, these sites of 
decision-making authority are now considered as possessing 
the potential to significantly impact overall political and 
policy directions (Hausegger, Hennigar and Riddell 2009). 
Not surprisingly, these developments raise questions con-
cerning the location of decision-making authority in demo-
cratic states (Clayton and Gillman 1999; Clayton 2002). This 
has, in turn, led to questions concerning which site of insti-
tutional decision-making authority is better positioned to 
protect the rights of both groups and individuals in demo-
cratic societies (Hiebert 2001; Banfield and Knopff 2009). It 
has also led to concerns over judicial activism, the sidestep-
ping of politics and the lack of democratic legitimacy associ-
ated with judicialization practices (Knopff and Morton 
2000; Rex and Jackson 2009; Lever 2009).  
 The judicial activism debate is predicated, in part, on the 
belief that the judiciary is an independent body free to ren-
der decisions with or without regard to the law, the other 
branches of government or the will of the general public 
(Segal and Spaeth 1996). This view underlies much of the 
behavioural models of judicial decision-making literature 
(Gillman 2004). However, judges, whether guided by strate-
gic motivations or their own personal principals, attitudes or 
characteristics, remain influenced and constrained by the 
institutional biases and characteristics of courts as a whole. 
While seemingly free to make decisions based on the facts 
and issues before them, individual judges remain bound by 
factors inherent to courts as institutions more generally, 
such as adherence to rules of evidence, past precedents and 
appropriate standards of review (Songer and Lindquist 
1996). Failure to abide by these constraints runs the risk of 
successful appeal or legislative override. Accordingly, the 
judicialization of particular political and policy making dis-
putes may be more fully understood through a consideration 
of these types of institutional characteristics and factors that 
are at play, such as through a manifestation of and in the 
context of the venue-shifting framework. Baumgartner and 
Jones (1991, 1993) view venue shifting as an attempt by 
policy actors, generally those opposed to a particular policy 
status quo, to move a political or policy dispute into an insti-
tutional setting that may be more receptive of their policy 
goals. Institutions are defined as the rules and procedures 
that structure the relationships between actors in a given 
policy community or in relation to a particular political or 
policy issue (Hall, 1996). They shape ideas and discourses by 
determining who talks to whom and the content, timing and 
place of those conversations and deliberations (Schmidt 
2006). In doing so, they provide both opportunities and 
constraints on the actions and strategies that actors may 
employ in the pursuit of their policy goals, including at-
tempts to alter the institution itself or, where possible, avoid 
it altogether (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Hay 1995).  
The rules and procedures that constitute specific and 
separate institutional arrangements each impact the efforts 
of policy actors in at least two different ways. First, they 
serve to shape the interactions of policy actors within the 
processes of each individual institutional site of decision-
making authority (Campbell 2004, Schmidt 2008). Second, 
the decisions generated from one institution, and perhaps 
most importantly, the justification for those decisions, may 
also provide opportunities or constraints in other institu-
tions. For example, judicial decisions may serve as con-
straints in other sites of decision making authority, particu-
larly in the case of multi-institutional decision making pro-
cesses and in relation to both factual and legal issues (Flynn 
2011). Implicit in this impact is the understanding that 
courts are not separate institutions apart from the other 
branches of government, but rather are one part of a broader 
landscape of political activity and overall governmental 
decision making processes (Shapiro 1964). However, while 
the importance of the interaction of ideas, interests and 
institutions is understood, the specific causal mechanisms of 
institutional change are not (Campbell 2004). Furthermore, 
less is known about the characteristics and biases of various 
institutional decision-making settings in which policy or 
political goals are pursued (Boothe and Harrison 2009), 
including the courts, or the receptiveness of particular insti-
tutional decision-making settings to the differing forms of 
discourse (Montpetit, Rothmayr and Varone 2005). This is 
particularly salient to any dispute, including the electoral 
reform debate, which seeks to alter the institutional ar-
rangements underlying the practices of democracy in Cana-
da.  
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Section 3 of the Charter of Rights and Free-
doms 
 
Much of the early litigation surrounding the democratic 
rights provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
dealt with situations in which individuals had been denied 
the right to vote or run for office due to considerations such 
as residency, incarceration, prior electoral fraud convictions 
and the holding of certain public offices or with concerns 
surrounding equality of voting power in relation to the es-
tablishment or revision of electoral boundaries (Knight 
1999). The latter set of electoral boundary cases culminated 
in the first case to appear before the Supreme Court of Can-
ada in relation to section 3, the 1991 decision in Carter v. 
Saskatchewan (Attorney General). 2  The majority of the 
court reasoned that there were more elements to the demo-
cratic protections contained in section 3 than the simple 
guarantees of the rights to vote and run for office. As is the 
case with most Charter rights, the court held that the demo-
cratic rights should be interpreted in a broad and purposive 
fashion and established an underlying principle supporting 
democratic rights in Canada, namely the notion of effective 
representation. The court went on to hold that while equality 
of voting power was an important component to effective 
representation, it was not the only consideration. The end 
result was the dismissal of the claim for an equalization of 
voting power through interference with the electoral district 
boundaries established by the independent commission.  
Two years later, in Haig v. Canada, the Supreme Court 
appeared to expand effective representation to also include 
the right “meaningful participation” in the electoral process-
es to select those representatives. However, the court dis-
missed the applicant’s claim to vote in a referendum on the 
Charlottetown Accord in the province of Quebec due to 
residency restrictions, holding that section 3 was explicitly 
limited to the election of federal and provincial representa-
tives alone. The court did not provide any further articula-
tion of the scope of section 3 or an expanded definition of the 
phrase “meaningful participation”. Subsequent cases also 
provided the Supreme Court the opportunity to more fully 
clarify and expand on the two underlying principles, but 
failed to do so. For example, in Thompson Newspapers v. Can-
ada, the court held that restrictions on publication of opinion 
polls in the last three days of an election campaign did not 
infringe upon section 3, but did not consider the issue of 
meaningful participation. In Harvey v. New Brunswick the 
court found that restrictions on the right vote and hold office 
due to conviction of election related offences were a prima 
facie violation of section 3, but upheld the provisions under 
section 1. Similarly, in Sauve (2002), the Crown conceded 
that restrictions on the right to vote for prisoners incarcer-
ated for a period of two years or greater was also a violation 
of section 3. In neither case was there a detailed considera-
tion of the underlying principles. 
The lack of clarity concerning effective representation 
and meaningful participation was rectified by the Supreme 
Court in Figueroa v. Canada. Figueroa, the leader of the 
Communist Party of Canada, challenged a number of the 
provisions of the federal Elections Act that created a fifty 
candidate threshold on political parties for official party 
status and provided a number of benefits to organizations 
that crossed that threshold while withholding the same from 
independent candidates and smaller parties. While the fed-
eral government responded to adverse lower court decisions 
by amending the act to lower the threshold and remove some 
of the more punitive elements of the legislative scheme, 
Figueroa’s appeal to the Supreme Court continued on the 
issues of the validity of any threshold, the rights of smaller 
parties and individual candidates to issues tax receipts out-
side of the election period, the right to retain unspent elec-
tion funds and restrictions on party identification on the 
ballot.  
In reaching its decision, the majority of the Supreme 
Court held that the right to participate in the electoral pro-
cess was the “central focus” of section 3. 
The right to run for office provides each citizen with the 
opportunity to present certain ideas and opinions to the 
electorate as a viable policy option; the right to vote pro-
vides each citizen with the opportunity to express support 
for the ideas and opinions that a particular candidate en-
dorses. In each instance, the democratic rights entrenched 
in s. 3 ensure that each citizen has an opportunity to express 
an opinion about the formation of social policy and the 
functioning of public institutions through participation in 
the electoral process. (emphasis added) 
While the court was in agreement on the final decision, they 
were divided on the interpretation of section 3 and its con-
sideration with respect to the rights of both individuals and 
communities. The majority grounded its decision on notions 
of individual participation. In contrast, the minority indicat-
ed that claims to democratic rights had to be based in the 
broader historical development and context of the political 
community as a whole. This has, in turn, led to a debate 
surrounding the theoretical models of democratic regulation 
employed by the courts, namely egalitarian versus libertari-
an or individual versus collective rights claims (MacIvor 
2004, Manfredi and Rush 2008, Katz 2011). On the basis of 
either judgment, the Supreme Court provided a broad right 
to participate in the electoral process; a right that extended 
beyond the simple exercise of the franchise and the right to 
stand as a candidate. In doing so, it also expanded the poten-
tial for individuals disenchanted with some aspect of the 
electoral process to seek redress and remedy through charter 
based litigation.  
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In examining the impact of the courts on the electoral re-
form debate in Canada as a means of better understanding 
the inherent characteristics and biases of this site of institu-
tional decision making authority, we combine the standard 
legal research technique of precedent tracing with a content 
analysis approach. This combination of methodologies pro-
vides a number of advantages. For our purposes, we are 
primarily concerned with how it provides a technique to 
expose the diversity of questions that are pursued through 
alternate policy-making venues as well as highlighting the 
receptiveness of those institutions (in this case the courts) to 
particular issues. This provides the opportunity to consider 
the likelihood of success in using courts to contest a policy or 
political dispute in the future or whether political actors are 
better off pursing their goals in alternate venues of contesta-
tion.  
We divide the sixteen final court decisions following 
Figueroa on the basis of outcomes as a means of providing a 
preliminary and quantitative understanding of the recep-
tiveness of courts on a general basis to institutional reform 
claims. As a means of better understanding the institutional 
characteristics and biases of courts, we also explore the 
nature of the issues under dispute in each case for a greater 
qualitative understanding of the reasons why courts make 
their decisions. We categorize electoral participation on an 
application of a threefold typology of the scope of electoral 
reform being sought (technical, minor and major) as estab-
lished by Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011).3 We follow their list-
ing of electoral reform dimensions (proportionality, election 
levels, inclusiveness, ballot structure and electoral proce-
dures) and also expand upon it by considering two addition-
al categories: financial and initiation.   
 
Analysis of Decisions 
From a quantitative perspective, the categorization of the 
various electoral reform disputes based on their outcomes 
provides a tentative conclusion of the receptiveness of the 
electoral reform issue to judicial intervention. The sixteen 
final post-Figueroa decisions suggest that the courts appear 
to be strongly disinclined to the various electoral reform 
arguments, with only four cases being successful while the 
remaining twelve were dismissed. This suggests a relatively 
conservative orientation by the courts in relation to electoral 
reform arguments. We now turn to consideration of the 
issues under dispute in each case. 
 
Positive Decisions 
In Jong v. Ontario (Attorney General), the court found that 
mandatory candidate deposits in Ontario also violated the 
Charter. In particular, the mandatory deposit scheme may 
force smaller parties to divert funds away from communica-
tion with the public and into allocating a significant amount 
of their resources to nominate a full slate of candidates. The 
court focused on the importance of the informational aspects 
of election campaigns, finding that it required protection for 
participants to say and voters to hear a particular message. 
Of specific concern was the fear that parties and individuals 
with greater financial resources would monopolize election 
discourse and render the involvement of less financially well 
off participants inconsequential. The removal of the deposits 
for all candidates affects the ballot structure dimension and 
is a major reform.  
Two other positive decisions dealt with issues of individ-
ual participation in the electoral process by public servants 
and fall under the general dimension of electoral procedures. 
In Directeur général des élections du Québec v. Camirand, 
the issue before the court was whether the Chief of Staff to 
the mayor of the city of Repentigny was prohibited from 
attending and participating in partisan activities on behalf of 
the incumbent mayor during the course of the municipal 
election campaign. In Calgary Health Region v. United 
Nurses of Alberta, judicial review of an arbitration award 
was pursued in relation to a finding that the Health Region’s 
policy requiring employees seeking political office to take an 
unpaid leave was contrary to provisions in collective agree-
ment. In each case, the court found that limitations on the 
ability of public servants to participate in partisan activity 
during the course of an election campaign infringed on the 
notion of meaningful participation. These electoral proce-
dure dimension claims affect less than one percent of the 
eligible population and would thereby be technical in nature. 
At issue in R. v. Nunziata were the provisions of the fed-
eral election scheme that required independent candidates 
to transfer excess campaign funds to the Receiver General. 
In contrast, party affiliated candidates were able to retain 
excess funds by way of transfer to either the local or national 
party organizations. The court found that this differential 
treatment of individual candidates affected the ability of 
Canadians to meaningfully participate in election cam-
paigns, both for candidates as well as the general public. 
First, the excess fund transfer requirement negatively affect-
ed the possibility that individuals may run for office due to 
the fact that they may lack sufficient financial resources to be 
able to communicate with the public on the same level as 
parties. Second, the possibility that donated funds could be 
forfeited to the government may make individuals reluctant 
to financially contribute to the campaigns of individual 
candidates, thereby also indirectly affecting broader aspects 
of electoral participation. As part of the financial dimension 
of the electoral system, the reforms seek to extend rights 
held by some participants to others, but likely effect less 




From a judicialization-based approach, there has been a 
single case that sought to alter the proportionality dimension 
of electoral systems in Canada. The Quebec Court of Appeal 
was faced with a challenge to the method of voting in Daoust 
v. Quebec, with the applicants seeking to overturn the first-
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past-the-post system in favour of a proportional representa-
tion system. While the court found that the issue was one 
that was capable of review by the courts and not a matter to 
be left solely to the legislatures, it dismissed the appellants' 
claim. On a factual basis, and relying upon expert evidence 
led by the government, the Court found that while elections 
under the first past the post system may lead to dispropor-
tionate results, this was not always the case and that the 
consistent under-representation of voters’ wishes did not 
equate to a democratic deficit or a lack of effective represen-
tation. Similarly, it found that an electoral system that tend-
ed to lead to majority governments, even in the absence of 
majority support, was both a political choice as well as lack-
ing any impact on the right to participate. Notably, the court 
appeared to establish the boundaries of the rights under 
section 3; indicating that they included the right to vote in 
periodic elections and to do so freely and secretly, the right 
to vote for the party or candidate of a voter’s choice the right 
to be a candidate, and the right to speak in public during an 
election campaign. In particular, the court indicated that 
effective representation was not dependent on the type of 
electoral system in place. 
In Henry v. Canada, as an aspect of the electoral dimen-
sion of inclusiveness, the applicant sought to strike down the 
provisions of the Elections Act that required individuals to 
prove their identity and place of residence in order to receive 
a ballot. While the court found that the restrictions in ques-
tion clearly violated section 3 as they may prevent people 
who are unable to provide identification or demonstrate 
residency from being able to vote, the restrictions were a 
reasonable limitation under section 1. As an aspect of voter 
registration, the proof of identification and residence re-
quirements are minor based reforms as they impose a cost 
on a voter.  
On the fourth dimension of electoral reform, namely bal-
lot choice, there were two cases. In Mahoney v. Chief Elec-
toral Officer of Canada, the court faced a challenge to the 
provisions of the federal Elections Act that required a candi-
date’s nomination papers include a statement signed by an 
auditor consenting to act in that capacity. While the court 
accepted that the applicant raised significant legal issues 
that required consideration by the court, the request for an 
interlocutory injunction preventing the federal election from 
occurring in the Yukon was dismissed, even though it had 
the effect of preventing the applicant from standing for 
office. The effort by Mahoney to remove the auditor provi-
sions would affect the available range of voter choices and 
therefore falls within the ballot structure dimension. It 
would also have the effect of removing the requirement for 
every candidate, thereby making it a major reform. In Ste-
vens v. Conservative Party of Canada, the issue before the 
court dealt with the registration of the Conservative Party of 
Canada and, more particularly, opposition to the merger of 
its two constituents, namely the Canadian Alliance and the 
Progressive Conservative Party of Canada. The applicant, a 
former cabinet minister in the Mulroney Progressive Con-
servative government, sought judicial review on the basis of 
procedural irregularities on the part of the Chief Electoral 
Office in the registration process of the newly formed party. 
The court dismissed the application, finding that the irregu-
larities did not lead to any substantial defect or departure 
from the purposes of the Act and, citing Figueroa, the need 
for stability within the electoral system. As the dispute in-
volved procedural irregularities involving a single party, the 
issue under dispute was technical. 
In Bourassa v. Ferdland, the applicant sought to annul 
the results of a municipal election on the grounds that the 
municipality had employed an experimental balloting sys-
tem. As this case involved the simple manner of how ballots 
were counted (by hand versus electronically) and did not 
effect voters or candidates, it falls under the general electoral 
procedures dimension and was technical in scope. The court 
dismissed the applicant’s case, finding that there was no 
evidence of any impropriety in the process of voting or the 
counting of the results. Notably, the court also held that the 
provisions of section 3 were not fully applicable to municipal 
elections in any event. 
The first set of financial dimension based decisions ad-
dressed issues of third party or non-candidate participation 
in election campaigns. In Harper v. Canada (Attorney Gen-
eral), the Supreme Court faced a challenge to advertising 
and spending limitations on third parties. The court cited 
Figueroa for the proposition that each citizen had the right to 
participate in the processes of democratic discussion that 
occurred during election campaigns, including the advance-
ment of unpopular or distasteful positions. However, in 
doing so, it found that unfettered participation may lead to a 
flooding of the electoral discourse by some parties, thereby 
drowning out other voices and denying those parties the 
right to meaningful participation. The court accepted adver-
tising and spending limitations on third parties as a signifi-
cant component of the legislative scheme to promote fair-
ness in the electoral process in order to allow for the poten-
tial participation by as many groups and individuals as pos-
sible.4 A similar result, at least in relation to the section 3 
arguments was reached in British Columbia Teachers’ Fed-
eration v. British Columbia (Attorney General) where a 
public sector union contested provincial third party advertis-
ing restrictions. The provisions in question did not prohibit 
advertising by third parties, but rather permitted them on a 
level lower than parties and candidates. The court, relying on 
Figueroa and Harper, held that while section 3 included the 
right to meaningful participation, those rights were not 
unlimited. In this case, given that the legislation did allow 
for modest informational campaigns by third parties, the 
court found no violation of section 3.5 From a financial di-
mension perspective, both cases sought to repeal provisions 
limiting third party participation and would therefore be 
considered major reforms.  
In terms of an impact on direct participants in election 
campaigns, there were four additional cases of financial 
based reform claims. In Longley v. Canada (Attorney Gen-
eral) the federal party financing scheme put in place follow-
ing the prohibition of corporate and union donations to 
parties was called into question. The applicant challenged 
the provisions that provided state funding on a per vote basis 
for parties that received either two percent of the vote na-
tionally or five percent of the vote for all ridings in which the 
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party fielded candidates. The court found that the state 
funded party financing scheme violated section 3 in that it 
provided an unfair disadvantage to larger parties. However, 
the court upheld the financing scheme under section 1 as its 
purpose of ensuring confidence and integrity of electoral and 
public financing systems was a valid purpose and out-
weighed the unfair treatment of smaller parties. As with 
Harper and BCTF, the applicant sought to repeal the finan-
cial provisions affecting all parties and therefore sought a 
major reform of the system. 
In Dostie v.Regie des alcool, des courses et des jeux, the 
applicant sought to alter the system of funding arrangement 
for parties through an appeal over the denial of tax exemp-
tion status. The application was predicated on the argument 
that parties, by virtue of their contributions to political de-
bate, performed a beneficial purpose at the community level 
and were therefore similar in purpose and activity to other 
charitable organizations. The commission rejected that 
charitable status under provincial legislation was considered 
part of the arguments advanced in relation to democratic 
rights under the Charter. As this would have involved the 
creation of a new financing system for political parties in the 
province of Quebec, it would be considered a major reform. 
The issue before the court in Conservative Fund Canada 
v. Canada (Elections Canada) dealt with the post-election 
financial reporting requirements of parties. In particular, the 
Conservative Party of Canada sought an order permitting it 
to amend its financial returns in order to include GST re-
bates as part of its financial transactions. The change would 
result in an overpayment by the party, thereby necessitating 
a need to repay funds to elections Canada.6 The court relied 
on Figueroa for the proposition that the purpose of the elec-
tion-financing regime was to promote equality in the level of 
political discourse that took place during the course of an 
election campaign through the use of financing and spending 
limits. The court rejected the applicant’s arguments, thereby 
privileging spending limits as a means of controlling the 
level of discourse. Given its limited application, this case 
involved a technical reform claim. In Jackson v. City of 
Vaughan, the sitting mayor sought to quash a pair of munic-
ipal by-laws that charged her with campaign finance offences 
under the Ontario Municipal Elections Act. The application 
was denied on the basis that the by-laws did not violate 
various provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In 
its reasons, the court, citing Figueroa, commented on the 
importance of the electoral financing regime as an integral 
component of the electoral process and the pursuit of fair-
ness in the electoral process. While the issues under consid-
eration could have wide ranging impact, the specific by-laws 
in question applied only to the applicant, thereby rendering 
this a technical based reform claim. 
On the initiation-based dimension, there was a single 
case. In Conacher v. Canada (Prime Minister) the court 
dismissed an application for a declaration that the 2008 
election call was illegal due to the failure of the Prime Minis-
ter to abide by fixed election date legislation. The court held 
that meaningful participation included the right of voters to 
make an informed decision between candidates and parties. 
In this case, there was no evidence that the applicant could 
not provide voters with information on the various policy 
positions of the parties. While the early election call may 
have resulted in an initial lack of preparedness on the part of 
various electoral participants, including third parties, this 
was insufficient to conclude an inability to meaningfully 
participate or that voters could not make informed decisions. 
The removal of the Prime Minister’s discretion to initiate an 
election would be a major reform if it had been successful.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
As Katz (2011) has identified and the plethora of post-
Figueroa cases demonstrate, electoral reform efforts in 
Canada have been pursued in alternate venues than legisla-
tive arenas, and to the courts in particular, as a means of 
pursuing electoral reform goals. These claims included both 
individual participation as well as systemic challenges rang-
ing from simple limitations on the right to vote due to identi-
ty and residency requirements through to calling into ques-
tion the constitutionality of the foundations of the electoral 
system itself. It demonstrates the broad range of electoral 
reform objectives pursued through the courts and the appar-
ent lack of consideration and/or receptiveness of these is-
sues in the legislative and public deliberative arenas.  
Electoral system change involves a number of different 
components, of which the method of voting is only one 
(Massicotte et al. 2004). This proportionality aspect of the 
various Canadian electoral systems has been contested in the 
courts in relation to the Quebec electoral system. However, 
as demonstrated in Table 1, there was a range of electoral 
system dimension based claims in Canada, with the regula-
tion surrounding the financing of parties and elections hav-
ing proven to be most litigious issue of electoral reform in 
Canada, making up seven of the sixteen cases (43.7 percent). 
Ballot structure and general election procedures were also 
fairly important issues, making up three of the sixteen (18.7 
percent) cases each. In terms of the scope of electoral reform 
issues being disputed, these pursuits included all three levels 
of reform, ranging from technical to minor and major based 
claims. However, the majority were primarily aimed at ma-
jor electoral reform claims, with eight of the sixteen (50.0 
percent) cases being pursued through the courts involving 
major based reform claims. 
The review of the precedent effect of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Figueroa also reveals that the courts appear to be 
a relatively conservative site of decision-making authority in 
relation to the electoral reform issues. Of the sixteen final 
decisions considered post-Figueroa, twelve of the sixteen 
(75.0 percent) cases brought forward by applicants were 
dismissed. More importantly, the courts, in giving meaning 
to the principles of effective representation and meaningful 
participation underlying the democratic rights under the 
Charter, established the boundaries of their willingness to 
intervene in institutional reform arguments. The courts have 
been willing to recognize and interfere with individual and 
collective participation based impediments and thereby 
protected the ability to participate by way of voting, standing 
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as candidates and having their voices heard within the broad 
arena of electoral discourse. However, when faced with the 
opportunity to give effect to broader issues of institutional 
reform, the Courts have tended to defer to the legislative 
branches of government and demonstrated an unwillingness 
to strike down or amend major electoral system concerns, 
with only one of the eight major electoral system claims (12.5 
percent) being successful. 
 
Table 1 – Electoral Reform Cases Post-Figueroa by Nature of 




The consideration of the post-Figueroa decisions also pro-
vides the opportunity to subject existing explanations of the 
manner in which the courts intervene in the electoral reform 
debate to greater scrutiny. For example, the suggestion that 
the litigation of electoral reform issues provides a greater 
opportunity for success in Canada due to the egalitarian 
nature of the courts is predicated on the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s decisions in Figueroa and Harper. The precedent 
tracing approach confirms that this argument is also sup-
ported by the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Con-
servative Fund Canada. Through a content analysis of these 
decisions, it becomes apparent that these cases involved 
claims by parties or individuals that had the potential of also 
affecting the rights of other participants in the system. In 
this sense, the rights claimants were seeking to privilege 
their claims to participation over the rights of others. As a 
result, it is likely not surprising that the courts opted for the 
interpretation of the democratic rights provisions that would 
afford the widest range of participation for the greatest 
number of individuals or organizations. However, the review 
of all of the Figueroa progeny demonstrates that there are a 
number of decisions in which the courts have restricted 
individual participation in some cases and have completely 
rejected systemic major based reform claims, such as altera-
tion of the method of voting, that would provide for more 
fair and equal electoral outcomes. A similar observation is 
evident in relation to individual versus collective claims, 
such as Mahoney, Stevens and Conacher. The underlying 
assumption is that the rights of the collective to an orderly, 
fair and efficient electoral process outweigh the rights of the 
individuals in these circumstances. In fact, the denial of 
individual claims for democratic rights that are upheld on 
the basis of section 1, as in Longley and Henry, is an explicit 
recognition of communal and collective interests over those 
of the individual. In contrast, our findings show that institu-
tional reform cases predicated on the denial of an individual 
participation rights, particularly of a procedural nature, have 
been more successful than those cases where there has been 
a direct challenge to the decision making settings of the 
electoral machinery themselves as sought in major based 
reform claims. It demonstrates that when it comes to issues 
of equality and fairness in the electoral process, courts pos-
sess relatively thin notions of democratic participation.  
The implications of these findings are clear. The courts 
consistently tend to utilize and apply technical definitions of 
democracy, rather than investigating the broader implica-
tions of the meaning of “effective representation” and 
“meaningful participation” in their consideration of claims 
for electoral reform and greater democratic legitimacy. As a 
result it would appear there is little reason for advocates of 
broad and significant electoral system change to continue to 
pursue their goals through this avenue of decision-making 
authority. Beyond the scope of this article, these findings 
also raise questions as to why advocates of electoral system 
change continue to use litigation as a strategy of change 
despite these apparent limitations. It also serves to placate 
concerns and fears of associated with judicial activism and 
the threat of the imposition of significant unwanted institu-
tional reform. Evidently, when it comes to institutional 
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Endnotes	  
1  The seven identified barriers include the institution-
al/procedural path to reform which favours the status quo, polit-
ical tradition, social structure, party system level stability, vested 
interests, the presence of coalition politics, the degree of agree-
ment over the need, scope and type of reform. 
2  Also known as the the Reference Re: Provincial Election 
Boundaries (Sask). 
3  Our body of cases includes both federal and provincial based 
reform efforts. Given the sovereign nature of provinces in Cana-
da in relation to their own procedures and lack of impact on the 
federal Parliament, we do not draw a distinction on the national 
versus sub-national aspects of reform being sought. See Jacobs 
and Leyenaar (2011) at footnote 9 . 
4  The Court did find that the advertising and spending limitations 
were a violation of freedom of expression under section 2(b) of 
the Charter, but were upheld under section 1. 
5  Unlike Harper, the Court found that provisions violated section 
2(b) and were not saved under section 1. 
6  The putative rational for the argument was to bring the Con-
servative Party into compliance with the elections financing re-
gime. However, the real purpose behind the move was more 
likely to force other and less financially well off parties to also 
undertake similar amendments and repayments and thereby ex-
acerbating the financial disparity between them and the finan-
cially well-off Conservatives.  	  
